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Abstract
We show that in competitive careers based on individual performance the least
productive individuals may have the highest probabilities to be promoted to top
positions. These individuals have the lowest fall-back positions and, hence, the
highest incentives to succeed in career contests. This detrimental incentive effect
exists irrespective of whether effort and talent are substitutes or complements in the
underlying contest-success function. However, in case of complements the incentive
effect may be be outweighed by a productivity effect that favors high effort choices
by the more talented individuals.
Key Words: career competition; contest; mediocracy.
JEL Classification: D72; J44; J45; M51
∗I would like to thank Oliver Gürtler, Daniel Müller, Petra Nieken, Anja Schöttner and the partic-
ipants of the economics workshop of the Leibniz University of Hannover, in particular Hendrik Hak-
enes, Vilen Lipatov and Georgios Katsenos, for helpful comments. Financial support by the Deutsche
Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG), grant SFB/TR 15, is gratefully acknowledged.
†University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D-53113 Bonn, Germany, tel: +49 228 733914, fax: +49
228 739210, e-mail: m.kraekel@uni-bonn.de.
1
"mediocracy = A society in which people with
little (if any) talent and skill are dominant
and highly influential." (dictionary)
1 Introduction
Career systems that are not based on individual performance but on criteria like seniority
may end up in a situation where people with average or less than average talent are
assigned to key positions. At the level of society, the direct consequence would be the
emergence of a mediocracy. At first sight, one might suspect that competitive career
systems with a performance-based job assignment should lead to a significantly better
outcome. However, in our paper we show that competitive careers systems have an
inherent tendency to promote the least productive individuals, thus leading to mediocracy.
The intuition for this result comes from the fact that more productive people have better
fall-back positions than less productive ones when failing in the competition for top
positions. Hence, highly productive people have only moderate incentives to win the
competition for top jobs, whereas individuals with low productivity have strong incentives
to avoid their rather unattractive fall-back positions.
We use a contest model based on Skaperdas (1996) to analyze competitive careers of
heterogeneous individuals. At the beginning, all individuals have the chance to reach the
top position with the highest possible career income. However, during the career we have
losers and winners, where winners still competing for the top position and losers compet-
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ing for less important jobs in a so-called consolation match.1 Winning such consolation
match defines the fall-back position of an individual.
We consider two different set-ups. First, we analyze a career model with effort and
talent (or productivity) being substitutes in the contest-success function of an individual.
Our results show that near the top position — individuals only have to pass one hurdle
for being assigned to the top job — the individuals with the worst fall-back positions
will be most likely to win the contest for the top position, due to the incentive effect
mentioned above. If individuals have to pass more than one hurdle to reach the top,
it will be crucial whether productivity has a higher impact on the fall-back position
or the future career and how dissipative the competition is on different career levels.
For example, if consolation contests are sufficiently dissipative (i.e., expected utility from
participating in these contests is rather low), fall-back positions will be quite unattractive,
but most unattractive for the least productive individuals. In this situation, again the
less productive individuals are most likely to reach the top.
In a second set-up, we consider a career model where talent and effort are complements
in the contest-success function. Now there is an additional effect that works into the
opposite direction of the incentive effect: The larger an individual’s productivity the
more effective will be the exertion of effort to win the contest. For this reason, a highly
talented individual may prefer to spend high effort despite an attractive fall-back position.
If this productivity effect is dominated by the incentive effect, society will still tend to
mediocracy. Otherwise, the most talented people will assert themselves in the career
competition and be assigned to the top position.
Besides the application to society in general, our model also offers insights for com-
1See, for example, Uehara (2009) on consolation contests in a Japanese corporation. For a theoretical
analysis of consolation contests see Kiyotaki (2004).
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petitive careers in a more concrete situation. For example, it can be applied to career
competition between politicians, who first struggle for being elected as local leader of
their political party. Thereafter, they may further compete for becoming national party
leader, governor or president of a certain state. As another example, consider the case
of internal careers within corporate hierarchies. These hierarchies are often organized
as internal labor markets with clearly structured career paths.2 Here, a manager first
wants to be promoted to become division head. In further career steps, the manager may
be elected to the board of directors or even compete for the position as chief executive
officer.
In these applications, those policies would work against the problem of mediocracy
that ensure highly talented individuals a significantly higher career income at the top
position than less talented candidates. In other words, if wages are not attached to jobs
but depend on the productivity of the respective individual, the top position should be
quite attractive for the most talented candidates. For example, top positions could be
combined with performance-based incentive schemes so that highly productive individuals
have sufficiently large expected incomes when reaching the top. By this policy, the
detrimental incentive effect mentioned above could be turned into a beneficial one.
However, for some career positions another solution may be appropriate. As an
extreme kind of solution, the career designer might rely on the seniority rule for job-
promotion decisions. Of course, this policy would completely eliminate career incentives
and, therefore, also the detrimental incentive effect. Moreover, the seniority rule has the
further advantage of tying promotion to the accumulation of human capital, because the
most senior candidate is also the one with the highest amount of on-the-job training. The
2See, for example, Baker, Gibbs and Holmström (1994).
4
seniority rule also works against the problem of influence activities and favoritism.3 If
possible, verifiable performance signals or self-enforcing implicit contracts can be used to
outweigh the missing career incentives.
Our paper is related to the literature on rank-order tournaments and contests. Lazear
and Rosen (1981), Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983) and Rosen (1986) belong to the first
papers that analyze (job-promotion) tournaments in the context of labor markets. A
wide range of papers discuss rent-seeking contests based on the seminal work by Tullock
(1980). Our paper builds on the axiomatized contest-success function introduced by
Skaperdas (1996), which has been used by a lot of subsequent papers (e.g., Wärneryd
(2001)). Konrad (2009) offers a comprehensive overview of the most frequently used
contest-success functions, applications of contest models and the most important results
in contest theory.
There are also parallels to the public economics literature on bad politicians. These
models offer an explanation for why political leaders and presidents often have rather
low qualifications or are of low quality. Such models typically follow either the political-
agency framework or the citizen-candidate approach (see, among many others, Caselli
and Morelli (2004), Messner and Polborn (2004), Mattozzi and Merlo (2007)).
Finally, the paper is related to the work on systematic decision failures in job pro-
motion. For instance, Chakravarty (1993) uses a Bayesian approach to show that too
ambitious definitions of elite leads to an inherent problem of selection failures at the top
of a hierarchy.
The paper is organized as follows. We start with the analysis of talent and effort being
substitutes in the contest-success function. Section 2 deals with the case where individuals
are near the top and only have to pass one hurdle to reach the highest possible position.
3See Milgrom and Roberts (1988) and Prendergast and Topel (1996).
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Section 3 considers a two-hurdle career model with productivity influencing both an
individual’s fall-back position and his future career. Section 4 offers a robustness check.
Here, we analyze whether the main findings also hold under the assumption of talent and
effort being complements. Section 5 concludes.
2 One-Hurdle Career
2.1 Basic Model
We consider a career game between  ≥ 3 risk neutral individuals (e.g., workers of the
same cohort entering a firm in a certain period). The structure of this game is sketched
in Figure 1.
[Figure 1]
The  players start by simultaneously choosing productive activities (e.g., efforts)  ≥ 0
( = 1     ) to become the winner of the major career contest. This winner receives a
high career income  . The  − 1 other players enter a consolation match where they
compete for less attractive positions. The winner of this consolation contest earns  ,
whereas the  − 2 losers get  with 0       .4 We assume that the three
career incomes are sufficiently large so that players choose positive efforts in equilibrium.
In both, the major contest for  and the consolation contest each player has to bear
the costs of his activity (e.g., disutility of effort). For simplicity, when player  exerts
activity level  let his costs be equal to . Moreover, in both contests, players face the
4Note that in our model career incomes are exogenously given, but as we can see below the general
effects still exist in a situation where a career designer endogenously chooses incomes.
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same contest-success function based on the one suggested by Skaperdas (1996):5 If player
 chooses  and the other players  6=  choose activity levels , then ’s probability of
winning is given by
 =  ( − ) ( − ) +P 6=  ( − ) (1)
with  (·) as monotonically increasing impact function that is concave and strictly posi-
tive.6 Hence, each player increases his winning probability by exerting more effort, but
the other contestants’ efforts as well as luck or measurement error also influence the out-
come of the contest. The parameter   0 indicates player ’s productivity.7 The lower
the value of  the more productive will be the player. If, for example, all players choose
identical activity levels, the most productive player will have the highest winning proba-
bility, whereas the player with the lowest productivity is least likely to win the contest.
The scaling parameter   0 is identical for all contestants. As can be seen from the
equilibrium outcomes below,  measures how dissipative the contest is (i.e., the larger 
the smaller will be an individual player’s expected utility from participating).
We assume that productivity parameters 1      are common knowledge. This
assumption can be justified for at least two reasons. First, players typically observe each
others’ qualifications, which are positively correlated with productivity.8 Second, note
that the common-knowledge assumption is only introduced for the contestants.9 These
players often observe each other when working close together at the same organization
5This assumption can be motivated by the fact that both contests take place between the same
individuals excepting the first-round winner, who is missing in the consolation round.
6As the player’s activity is assumed to be productive,  ( − ) may describe a worker’s or a
politician’s output.
7Hence, effort and ability/productivity are substitutes in the players’ impact function. We will com-
ment on the case of complements in Section 4.
8On the one hand, following human capital theory based on Becker (1962), investment in a player’s
skills rises his productivity, which is certified by a formal qualification. On the other hand, according to
Spence (1973), high qualifications can be a credible signal for corresponding high ability.
9We do not have a contest designer, who shares the same information as the contestants. Note that
our results will not change when introducing an uninformed designer, who endogenously chooses optimal
tournament prizes but cannot observe individual productivities.
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every day. For example, the two arguments hold for a situation where workers compete
for job promotion in internal labor markets and for a situation where politicians compete
for becoming the leader of their political party.
Although we do not explicitly specify a welfare function, we assume that welfare will be
highest if the most productive player (i.e., the one with parameter value min{1     })
passes the decisive hurdle by winning the major contest and is assigned to the most
important position, which is associated with career income  .
2.2 Consolation Contest
We start the analysis by solving the contest game of those  − 1 players that have failed
in the major contest and, therefore, enter the consolation stage. Here, the winner earns
career income  but the −2 losers end up with the lower income . Player  chooses
activity  to maximize expected utility
g  () =  + ( − )  ( − ) ( − ) +P 6=  ( − ) − 
Since this objective function is strictly concave and, by assumption, career incomes are
sufficiently large to prevent a corner solution where neither player chooses positive effort,
the equilibrium is described by the  − 1 first-order conditions
( − )  0 ( − )P 6=  ( − )h
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )i2 = 1
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which can be rearranged to
 − hP−1
=1  ( − )
i2 = 1 0 ( − ) h ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )i
with player  denoting an arbitrary opponent of player . In analogy, the first-order
condition of player  6=  can be written as
 − hP−1
=1  ( − )
i2 = 1 0 ( − ) h ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )i 
Combining the right-hand sides of both equations yields
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) =
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) 
As both sides describe the same monotonically increasing function of − and −,
respectively, we have
 −  =  − ∀ ( ) 
Hence, the higher the productivity of a player the lower will be his equilibrium effort.
Intuitively, a highly productive player prefers to save effort costs by choosing a low activity
level since activities and productivity parameters are substitutes in the impact function
 (·). By inserting  −  =  − ∀ ( )  in player ’s first-order condition, the
equilibrium activity level ∗ is described by
( − )
( − 1)2  (∗ − )
=
1
 0 (∗ − ) ( − 2) ⇔
∗ = 
µ
( − 2) ( − )
( − 1)2
¶
+ 
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with  (·) denoting the monotonically increasing inverse function of  0. Equilibrium
activity increases in the size of the career income difference  − , because any con-
testant earns at least  in the consolation round. Furthermore, ∗ is non-increasing
and for   3 strictly decreasing in the number of contestants. This effect can be la-
beled discouragement effect: Each player exerts less effort when the number of opponents
increases since his relative impact on the outcome of the contest becomes smaller.
Finally, we insert equilibrium activities in the objective function g  (). Thus, in
equilibrium player ’s expected utility is given by
g∗ (∗ ) =  +  −  − 1 −
µ
( − 2) ( − )
( − 1)2
¶
− 
Now, we can see why  measures the contest’s degree of dissipation. Note that, in
equilibrium, a player’s winning probability is always 1 ( − 1), irrespective of the value
of . However, a player’s equilibrium activity and, therefore, his effort costs rise in
. Consequently, the higher , the lower will be each player’s expected utility from
participating in the consolation match. Nevertheless, a player strictly benefits from higher
productivity (i.e.,g∗ (∗ ) decreases in ).
2.3 Major Contest
A player will earn the highest career income  , if he passes the hurdle of winning the
major contest. In case of losing, he will be relegated to the consolation contest associated
with expected utilityg∗ (∗ ). Hence, player ’s objective function in the major contest
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can be written as
d  () =   ( − ) ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
+g∗ (∗ )
Ã
1−  ( − ) ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
!
− 
= g∗ (∗ ) +
³
 −g∗ (∗ )´ ·  ( − )
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − ) − 
In analogy to the consolation contest, the first-order conditions of two arbitrary players
 and  are given by
 −g∗ (∗ )
[
P
=1  ( − )]2
=
1
 0 ( − ) [ ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )]
and
 −g∗ (∗)
[
P
=1  ( − )]2
=
1
 0 ( − ) [ ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )] 
Hence, if   , then we haveg∗ (∗ ) g∗ (∗) and
1
 0 ( − )
h
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )i 
1
 0 ( − )
h
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )i ⇔
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) 
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) 
which implies −   − since [ () +P 6=  ( − )] 0 () is a monoton-
ically increasing function of . Let (1)  (2) · · ·  () denote the order of the players’
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productivity parameters (i.e., player (1) is the most productive one), ∗(1) ∗(2)     ∗()
the respective equilibrium efforts and ∗(1) ∗(2)     ∗() the winning probabilities in the
major contest. Then we obtain the following result:
Proposition 1 The players’ winning probabilities in the major contest satisfy ∗(1) 
∗(2)      ∗() and the corresponding equilibrium efforts ∗(1)  ∗(2)      ∗().
Proof. The first part immediately follows from the fact that    implies  −  
− and that  =  ( − ) [ ( − )+P 6=  ( − )] is strictly increasing
in −. The second part follows from −  − ⇔ −  − ( − )  0.
Proposition 1 shows that the more productive a player, the less likely he will win
the major contest and the less effort he will choose. The intuition for the first result
comes from the players’ different fall-back positions in the major contest. If a player
has a large productivity (i.e., a small ), then he will also be a strong player in the
consolation match, which will guarantee him a large expected utilityg∗ (∗ ) as a kind
of fall-back position. This fact reduces his incentives in the major contest so that we have
a tendency to mediocracy where key positions are filled by less productive individuals,
leading to welfare losses. In other words, participation in the consolation match is rather
unattractive for the less productive players so that they have very strong incentives to
win the major contest.
Note that although we assume career incomes to be exogenously given, our results
of Proposition 1 as well as the following results will qualitatively hold under endogenous
incomes or prizes that are optimally chosen by a contest designer before the competition
starts. The career incomes or contest prizes of course influence the levels of all players’
equilibrium efforts. However, they neither have an impact on the players’ effort differences
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− in the consolation match nor an impact on the ranking between − and −
in the major contest. As the same holds for the findings in the following sections our
results are robust with respect of exogeneity/endogeneity of the contest prizes.
The result on effort ranking ∗(1)  ∗(2)      ∗() stems from the intuition before
together with the fact that effort and productivity are substitutes in the impact function.
Hence, even if all players had identical fall-back positions, the order ∗(1)  ∗(2)     
∗() would not change. Welfare was solely defined via the career decision based on the
outcome of the major contest. However, if the activity levels ∗ ( = 1     ), which
are productive by assumption, were also important for welfare considerations, we might
have a second source for welfare losses since the most productive individuals choose the
lowest activity levels.
3 Two-Hurdle Career
In this section, we consider the case where a player has to pass two career hurdles to
reach the top. This situation is described by Figure 2.
[Figure 2]
First, a player must assert himself in the organizational unit that he belongs to (e.g.,
a division or affiliate of a corporation, a certain political party). Second, when being
successful in becoming head of the organizational unit (e.g., division head or party leader),
he enters a higher-order contest to reach the top position in his career path (e.g., CEO
of the corporation or president of a state). As crucial difference to the one-hurdle career,
now a player has to succeed two times before reaching the top and a player’s productivity
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has both an influence on his fall-back position and an influence on his future career.
3.1 Model Modifications
There are two organizational units,  and , that consist of  and  members,
respectively, with  ≥ 3 ( ∈ {}). In each unit , the  members compete for
becoming unit head (level-I contests). These two contests are modeled analogously to the
one in Subsection 2.1. Each member  ∈ {1     } chooses activity level  ≥ 0 (at
costs ), which influences his probability of winning the level-I contest for unit head ,
 =  ( − ) ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )  (2)
Again,  indicates the productivity of the respective player, with lower values corre-
sponding to higher productivities. The parameter   0 measures the grade of dissipa-
tion in the level-I contests.10 If player  wins and becomes unit head he will enter the
higher-order level-II contest where he competes against the other unit head to reach the
top of his career. However, the  − 1 losers are relegated to a consolation contest in
unit  where the winner earns career income   0 and the  − 2 losers get 0.
As outcome of the level-I contests, two players — the unit heads  and  — enter
the level-II contest. Here, they compete for the unique top position, which is associated
with career income  . Whereas the winner of the level-II contest is assigned to this
top position, the loser gets a lower career income  with 0       . Career
incomes are assumed to be sufficiently large so that the players exert strictly positive
efforts in each contest. The contest-success function for the level-II contest is again
10Our results will not change qualitatively, if we define different parameters  and  for the two
units.
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a Skaperdas-type function like (1) and (2). The scaling parameter for measuring the
degree of dissipation at level II is denoted by   0.
As in Section 2, we assume that from a welfare perspective the player with the highest
productivity (i.e., the one with parameter min{1      | ∈ {}}) should be
assigned to the top position with career income  .
3.2 Level-II Contest
Let  and  denote the productivity parameters of the two unit heads, who enter the
level-II contest, and  and  the corresponding activity variables. In the contest, the
head of unit  maximizes
d () =  + ( − )  ( − )P
Ω∈{}  (Ω − Ω) − 
Proceeding in the same way as in Section 2, we find that, in equilibrium, activity levels
are described by
 − hP
Ω∈{}  (Ω − Ω)
i2 = 1 ( − )  0 ( − )
=
1
 ( − )  0 ( − )
yielding (−) 0(−) = (−) 0(−) and, hence,
− = −. Altogether, in the level-II contest the head of organizational
unit  optimally chooses
∗ = 
µ − 
4
¶
+ 
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and gets expected utility
d∗ () =  +  − 2 −
µ − 
4
¶
− 
We can see that in equilibrium the more productive unit head exerts less effort than the
other head, but has the same probability of being promoted to the top position since the
higher productivity completely outweighs the effort deficit. Thus, it is pure luck whether
the better head is assigned to the top job or not.
3.3 Level-I Contests
Consider the contest in organizational unit . The objective function of member  can
be written as
 () =g∗ +
³d∗ −g∗´ ·  ( − )
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − ) − 
If player  wins, he will earn the expected utility from participating in the level-II contest,
d∗. In case of losing, he will enter the consolation contest of his unit , where he
receives expected utility g∗. Hence, his fall-back position is characterized by g∗
and the extra utility from being successful at level I byd∗−g∗. From the first-order
condition we obtain the following description of player ’s equilibrium activity:
d∗ −g∗hP=1  ( − )i2 =
1
 0 ( − )
hP
 6=  ( − )
i  (3)
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To further characterize the equilibrium activities, we have to calculate player ’s fall-back
positiong∗. Applying the results for the consolation contest of Subsection 2.2 yields
g∗ (∗) =  − 1 −
µ
( − 2)
( − 1)2
¶
− 
and, therefore,11
d∗ −g∗ =  + 2 −  − 1 + ( − ) 
+
µ
( − 2)
( − 1)2
¶
−
µ − 
4
¶

Hence, if    then for two arbitrary members  and  of unit  in the level-I contest
we have d∗ −g∗  d∗ −g∗ ⇔   . The first-order conditions (3) of
players  and  can be written as
d∗ −g∗hP=1  ( − )i2
=
1
 0 ( − ) [ ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )]
and
d∗ −g∗hP=1  ( − )i2
=
1
 0 ( − ) [ ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )] 
11Recall that, by assumption, career incomes guarantee interior solutions for the equilibrium activities.
Hence, we must have d∗ −g∗  0.
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Thus, ifd∗ −g∗ d∗ −g∗ then
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) 
 ( − ) +P 6=  ( − )
 0 ( − ) 
which implies  −    − , analogously to the findings in Subsection 2.3.
Since this comparison holds for any two members of organizational unit  ∈ {} and
since players have identical winning probabilities in the level-II contest, we have proven
the following result:
Proposition 2 If   , then the most (least) productive player of each unit  ∈
{}, i.e., the player with  = min{1     } (with  = max{1     }),
has the lowest (highest) probability to reach the top position with career income .
Proposition 2 shows that the mediocracy result of the one-hurdle career will prevail
under the assumptions of the two-hurdle career if the level-I contests are more dissipative
then the level-II contest. The intuition for this result is the following. The higher 
relative to  , the less attractive will be participation in the consolation match for the
players. Moreover, since expected utility increases in the productivity of a player (i.e.,
decreases in ), the less productive a player the stronger will be his incentives to avoid
a consolation match and, hence, to pass the hurdle that leads to participation in the
level-II contest.
A situation with level-I contests being more dissipative than the level-II contest seems
quite realistic. For example, note that a single player is less visible in the large contest
against  − 1 opponents on level I compared to the level-II contest with two players.
Therefore, it is rather difficult for an individual to stand up to his opponents on level I
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compared to level II. In order to become winner on level I, each player has to spend a
lot of effort, which makes participation in the contest costly and, hence, level-I contests
quite dissipative.12
4 Activities and Productivity Parameters as Com-
plements
So far we have assumed that activities () and productivity parameters () are substi-
tutes in the players’ impact function  (·). This assumption drives part of the previous
results, in particular the findings that players with higher productivities (i.e., lower val-
ues of ) choose lower efforts in equilibrium. However, this paper does not focus on
effort choice but on the probability that the most productive player is not assigned to the
top career position. In this section, we will check the robustness of the finding that the
correlation between productivity and promotion probability of a player may be strictly
negative.
For this purpose, we reconsider the one-hurdle career model and assume that player
’s contest-success function is given by
ˇ =

³

´

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´ (4)
with  (·) denoting the same strictly positive, increasing and concave impact function as
before. Again, the smaller  the more productive will be the respective player, and for
the case of identical activity levels by all players the most productive one has the highest
12Note that equilibrium efforts strictly increase in the dissipation parameters ,  and  , respec-
tively.
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winning probability. However, comparison of (1) and (4) shows that (besides skipping the
dissipation parameter ) the contest-success functions  and ˇ differ significantly. Con-
trary to (1), now the activity variable and the productivity parameter are complements
in the sense that lower values of  make higher activity levels  more effective.13
As in Section 2, we first solve the consolation contest game and then turn to the major
contest. In the consolation contest, player  maximizesg  () = +( − )· ˇ−.
The first-order conditions of two arbitrary players  and  can be combined to
( − )hP−1
=1 
³

´i2 =  0 ³´ h ³´+P 6=  ³ ´i
=

 0
³

´h

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´i  (5)
which yields the following equilibrium outcomes:
Lemma 1 In the consolation contest, if    then (i) ˇ∗  ˇ∗ and (ii) g∗ (∗ ) 
g∗ (∗).
Proof. Part (i) can be shown by contradiction. Suppose that
ˇ∗ ≤ ˇ∗ ⇔ 
∗
 
∗
  (6)
From the first-order conditions we obtain

h

³∗ ´+P 6=  ³∗ ´i
 0
³∗ ´ =

h

³∗´+P 6=  ³∗ ´i
 0
³∗´  (7)
Since [ () +P 6=  ³∗ ´] 0 () is a monotonically increasing function of , (6) and
(7) can only be satisfied at the same time if   , a contradiction. (ii) Since player 
13Since  (·) is concave, in (1) lower values of  make activity choice even less effective.
20
can always choose the same effort level as  so that he has the same effort costs but a
higher winning probability we must haveg∗ (∗ ) g∗ (∗) in equilibrium.
Lemma 1 points out that, in the consolation match, more productive players have
higher winning probabilities and larger expected utilities than less productive players.
Result (ii) is also important for the major contest, where players compete for the top
position with income  . Due to the positive correlation between productivity and
expected utility, more productive players have better fall-back positionsg∗ (∗ ) in the
major contest, leading to less incentives. This effect also works in the models with
substitutes (Sections 2 and 3) and will be called incentive effect.
In the major contest, player maximizesd  () =g∗ (∗ )+(−g∗ (∗ ))·ˇ−.
The first-order conditions of two players  and ,
 −g∗ (∗ )hP
 
³

´i2 =  0 ³´h ³´+P 6=  ³ ´i
and
 −g∗ (∗)hP
 
³

´i2 =  0 ³´ h ³´+P 6=  ³ ´i  (8)
together withg∗ (∗ ) g∗ (∗) imply

h

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´i
 0
³

´  
h

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´i
 0
³

´  (9)
The inequality shows that solutions of type    are always possible. Such outcomes
coincide with the findings above where more productive players are less likely to obtain
the top career position. However, the parameters  and  in the numerators of the two
sides in (9) indicate that we cannot rule out solutions with    if  is sufficiently small
and  sufficiently large. This effect can be labeled productivity effect. Hence, if activities
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and productivity parameters are complements in the impact function, we will have two
effects that work into opposite directions. Coming back to our question regarding efficient
assignment at the top we obtain the following result:
Proposition 3 Consider the major contest for the top position with income  and let
  . If

 
 −g∗ (∗)
 −g∗ (∗ )  (10)
then ˇ∗  ˇ∗.
Proof. Combining the first-order conditions (8) yields

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´
 0
³

´ = 
h
 −g∗ (∗ )i

h
 −g∗ (∗)i

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´
 0
³

´ 
If (10) is satisfied, we will have

³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´
 0
³

´  
³

´
+
P
 6= 
³

´
 0
³

´
and, thus,    , which implies ˇ∗  ˇ∗ for the winning probabilities in equilibrium
according to (4). From Lemma 1(ii) we know that both sides of inequality (10) are larger
than one so that there exist parameter constellations for which (10) holds and others for
which (10) does not hold.
Condition (10) points out the two opposing effects. While the right-hand side describes
the incentive effect, the left-hand side characterizes the productivity effect. If the incentive
effect dominates the productivity effect, more productive players will have lower winning
probabilities in the major contest than less productive ones.
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5 Conclusions
At first sight, one might expect that career contests perfectly correspond to the well-
known phrase "survival of the fittest". According to Darwin, there should be a natural
selection among heterogeneous individuals so that the best suited ones will win the com-
petition for reproduction. Relating to career competition, the most talented or most
productive players should win and be promoted to the top positions within structured
career paths. However, in our paper we show that, contrary to the Darwinian view, the
least productive players may have the highest probability of winning career competition.
The intuition comes from the fact that the phrase "survival of the fittest" implicitly as-
sumes that all individuals choose the same activity level. Maybe, in biology this crucial
assumption holds. In an economic context, however, equilibrium behavior of heteroge-
neous players usually differs. Since the least productive players are characterized by
the lowest fall-back positions, these individuals have the highest incentives to win career
competition and, thereby, to avoid their unattractive fall-back options. In this sense, we
have a natural tendency that the least productive players succeed. It is important to
emphasize that under identical activity levels our model would replicate the Darwinian
outcome: the individuals with the highest productivity would most likely win the career
contest.
In our paper, we used a game-theoretic perspective to show how the detrimental ef-
fect of fall-back positions may lead to adverse career outcomes for society. Switching to a
contract-theoretic view would not qualitatively alter our results. Allowing endogenously
chosen, optimal career incomes would probably lead to a change in the levels of equi-
librium activities. However, as mentioned in Section 2 the ranking between the players’
activities and winning probabilities would not change. Introducing reservation utilities for
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the players may even reinforce our findings. If the most productive players have also the
highest reservation utilities, these players may prefer their outside options and decide not
to participate in the consolation contest. If the fall-back positions are now determined by
the players’ different reservation utilities, we will have the same natural tendency that the
most productive players have the lowest incentives to succeed in a given career contest.
All these considerations are based on the assumption that the contest designer cannot use
a mechanism to reveal the players’ types and then choose type-dependent contest prizes
to adjust individual incentives. As has been emphasized by Malcomson (1984, 1986),
identical prizes for all contestants are important if individuals only have unverifiable but
observable performance signals. In that case, under different prizes the principal would
ex-post always claim that the player with the lowest winner prize has performed best,
thereby saving labor costs. Since the players can anticipate such opportunistic behavior,
contest incentives would break down if prizes differ.
According to the Peter Principle, individuals are promoted as long as they reach
their level of incompetence. This observation was made by Peter and Hull (1969). The
outcome of the Peter Principle is based on two rules — currently good performance is
rewarded by job promotion and demotions are not possible. In the subsequent economic
work, the Peter Principle has been used as a synonym for the misallocation of managers
at (high) hierarchy levels. For example, Prendergast (1992) explains such misallocation
by the personnel policy of hiding good talents, whereas the explanation of Lazear (2004)
is based on temporary luck. In the light of our model, misallocation at higher hierarchy
levels can be explained by a detrimental incentive effect that gives less talented individuals
strong incentives to assert themselves in competitive careers.
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Figure 1: One-Hurdle Career 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Two-Hurdle Career 
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